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Obama is wrong on Afghanistan

Canadian Dimension, July 24th, 2008

(By Patrick Seale, Special to Gulf News. July 24) On his foreign travels this week, Barack Obama, the Democratic presidential candidate, pledged to switch the focus of America’s military effort from Iraq to Afghanistan - the ‘central front’ - in his estimation of the war on terror. US combat troops would be withdrawn from Iraq within 16 months of his taking office, but thousands more, he promised, would be sent to fight in Afghanistan, and be ready to cross the border into Pakistan’s tribal areas to root out jihadist sanctuaries there.

This commitment - and the explicit threat to expand the war - is almost certainly a grave mistake. Costly in men and treasure, it is unlikely to be successful and threatens to be hugely damaging not only to American interests in the Muslim world and Central Asia, but also to Afghanistan itself, to Pakistan and to Indo-Pakistan relations.

No doubt, Obama senses that the American public yearns for some sort of victory against Al Qaida, the elusive terrorist group that dared strike at America’s heartland on 9/11. “Losing is not an option when it comes to Al Qaida…” he told CBS. He wants to look tough on security issues, where his rival John McCain seems to have an edge.

But this is to be a slave to old thinking, and in particular to a view of doubtful validity - but accepted as gospel by many Western politicians - that Western security depends on locating the ageing Osama Bin Laden in some remote mountain fastness, and destroying him.

This is to mistake the nature of the threat to Western societies. Far more dangerous than Al Qaida is the mass of angry tribesmen and city-dwellers in the Afghan provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, in Pakistan’s Balochistan, in the tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan, in and around the teeming city of Peshawar, and even further afield in neighbouring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

These men, and many of their co-religionaries in the wider Muslim world, are angry because of America’s “war on terror”. For many of them, it has meant the presence of an “infidel” army in Muslim lands, the vast disruption of their traditional way of life, the killing of their wives and children by US air strikes, the flourishing of cruel and greedy warlords in outlying Afghan areas, and the rule in Kabul of President Hamid Karzai, seen as a Western puppet presiding over a corrupt and ineffective regime.

Military means

To pursue the battle against Al Qaida by military means is to awaken these powerful tribal and Muslim resentments - as well as to threaten the already precarious stability of Pakistan, a Muslim nuclear power of 165 million people locked in a dangerous confrontation with India in both Kashmir and Afghanistan.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former US national security adviser, is a rare American voice to say (in an interview with the Financial Times last Monday) that “putting more troops into Afghanistan is not the entire solution… we run the risk that our military presence will gradually turn the Afghan population entirely against us”.

Gérard Chaliand, a French counter-terrorist expert, goes further still. “Victory is impossible in Afghanistan,” he declared (in an interview with Le Monde, last Tuesday). “Today, one must attempt to negotiate. There is no other way… The insurgency is not led by Al Qaida on by foreign fighters. It is a Pashtun matter [the majority tribe in Afghanistan, with another 15 million members in Pakistan]. The Pashtuns are fighting first of all for themselves.”

Marc Sagemen, a leading American expert on Muslim extremism, argues in his book, Leaderless Jihad, that free-lance radicals are more of a threat to Western interests than Al Qaida itself which, he claims, has already been “neutralised operationally”.

Another important book which denounces America’s obsession with destroying Al Qaida is Ahmad Rashid’s Descent into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. He argues that the neo-con obsession with Al Qaida has blinded the US to the impact of the war on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir, leading in turn to the powerful resurgence of the Taliban on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.

It is surely the greatest folly for Nato to declare - and seemingly to believe - that its survival as an alliance, and indeed its very raison d’être, depends on victory in the Afghan theatre, a war that is virtually unwinnable.

Not the least of the problems is the underlying tension in Afghanistan between India and Pakistan, greatly exacerbated by this month’s suicide car bomb outside the Indian embassy in Kabul which killed 58 people. India blamed the atrocity on Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI), a charge that Pakistan vigorously denies.

It needs to be said, however, that Pakistan’s military establishment views Afghanistan as its “strategic depth” in any conflict with India. It is ready to employ strong-arm tactics to ensure that the Kabul government tilts its way rather than India’s.

Anti-American sentiment

With anti-American sentiment running high in Pakistan, the coalition government of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani has no wish to get sucked into America’s “war on terror”. It is seeking to negotiate with militant leaders in the tribal agencies, not make war on them, as America is urging. Obama’s pledge to order military strikes against terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan is viewed in Islamabad as highly irresponsible.

As is now widely recognised, Muslim radicals throughout the world have been inflamed by the wanton destruction of Iraq, by the war in Afghanistan, by Israel’s cruel oppression of the Palestinians, and by the whole notion of the “war on terror”, seen as a war on Islam itself. The way to defuse the threat the radicals pose is to change the policies. To seek to destroy them by military force is to radicalise them further.

Yet, in spite of the mass of evidence that force is not the way to tame the swelling army of militants, both US presidential contenders, Barack Obama and John McCain, speak of “turning around Afghanistan” by pouring in more troops. The sobering fact - confirmed by the US military - is that attacks by militants against the US-led coalition in Afghanistan have risen by 40 per cent this year, compared with 2007.

If not force, then what? Oxfam, the British humanitarian organisation, is not alone among NGOs in pleading for a change of focus. “Unless the next American president… builds on the existing commitments to help lift the Afghan people out of extreme poverty and protect civilians, it will be impossible for the country to achieve lasting peace,” Oxfam said in a recent statement.

Afghanistan urgently needs an internationally-negotiated ceasefire followed by the formation of a new government, including the Taliban. It also needs a massive injection of development funds, distributed under neutral UN auspices. And, just as a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is essential to end the violence in the Middle East, so a resolution of the Indo-Pakistan quarrel over Kashmir is vital to the health of the subcontinent.

These should be the priorities of the international community, rather than sending more young men to a useless death in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan.


Patrick Seale
is a commentator and author of several books on Middle East affairs.

Canadian Dimension Matthew Brett is the Canadian Dimension weblog editor and a Montreal-based journalist at a weekly newspaper. Read other posts by Canadian Dimension.

One Comment

  1. I agree. The really disappointing aspect of Obama is that he was supposed to be the peace candidate. But everything that he appeared to stand for- multiculturalism, religious toleration, peace, diplomacy- all are overshadowed by this foolish idea of moving the war to Pakistan.

    Moving the war on terror to Pakistan could have disastrous consequences on both the political stability in the region, and in the broader balance of power. Scholars such as Richard Betts accurately point out that beyond Iran or North Korea, “Pakistan may harbor the greatest potential danger of all.” With the current instability in Pakistan, Betts points to the danger that a pro-Taliban government would pose in a nuclear Pakistan. This is no minor point to be made. While the Shi’a in Iran are highly unlikely to proliferate WMD to their Sunni enemies, the Pakistanis harbor no such enmity toward Sunni terrorist organizations. Should a pro-Taliban or other similar type of government come to power in Pakistan, Al-Qaeda’s chances of gaining access to nuclear weapons would dramatically increase overnight.
    There are, of course, two sides to every argument; and this argument is no exception. On the one hand, some insist that American forces are needed in order to maintain political stability and to prevent such a government from rising to power. On the other hand, there are those who believe that a deliberate attack against Pakistan’s state sovereignty will only further enrage its radical population, and serve to radicalize its moderates. I offer the following in support of this latter argument:
    Pakistan has approximately 160 million people; better than half of the population of the entire Arab world. Pakistan also has some of the deepest underlying ethnic fissures in the region, which could lead to long-term disintegration of the state if exacerbated. Even with an impressive growth in GDP (second only to China in all of Asia), it could be decades before wide-spread poverty is alleviated and a stable middle class is established in Pakistan.
    Furthermore, the absence of a deeply embedded democratic system in Pakistan presents perhaps the greatest danger to stability. In this country, upon which the facade of democracy has been thrust by outside forces and the current regime came to power by coup, the army fulfills the role of “referee within the political boxing ring.” However, this referee demonstrates a “strong personal interest in the outcome of many of the fights and a strong tendency to make up the rules as he goes along.” The Pakistani army “also has a long record of either joining in the fight on one side or the other, or clubbing both boxers to the ground and taking the prize himself” (Lieven, 2006:43).
    Pakistan’s army is also unusually large. Thathiah Ravi (2006:119, 121) observes that the army has “outgrown its watchdog role to become the master of this nation state.” Ravi attributes America’s less than dependable alliance with Pakistan to the nature of its army. “Occasionally, it perceives the Pakistan Army as an inescapable ally and at other times as a threat to regional peace and [a] non-proliferation regime.” According to Ravi, India and Afghanistan blame the conflict in Kashmir and the Durand line on the Pakistan Army, accusing it of “inciting, abetting and encouraging terrorism from its soil.” Ravi also blames the “flagrant violations in nuclear proliferation by Pakistan, both as an originator and as a conduit for China and North Korea” on the Pakistan Army, because of its support for terrorists.
    The point to be made is that the stability of Pakistan depends upon maintaining the delicate balance of power both within the state of Pakistan, and in the broader region. Pakistan is not an island, it has alliances and enemies. Moving American troops into Pakistan will no doubt not only serve to radicalize its population and fuel the popular call for Jihad, it could also spark a proxy war with China that could have long-lasting economic repercussions. Focusing on the more immediate impact American troops would have on the Pakistani population; let’s consider a few past encounters:
    On January 13, 2006, the United States launched a missile strike on the village of Damadola, Pakistan. Rather than kill the targeted Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, the strike instead slaughtered 17 locals. This only served to further weaken the Musharraf government and further destabilize the entire area. In a nuclear state like Pakistan, this was not only unfortunate, it was outright stupid.
    On October 30, 2006, the Pakistani military, under pressure from the US, attacked a madrassah in the Northwest Frontier province in Pakistan. Immediately following the attack, local residents, convinced that the US military was behind the attack, burned American flags and effigies of President Bush, and shouted “Death to America!” Outraged over an attack on school children, the local residents viewed the attack as an assault against Islam.
    On November 7, 2006, a suicide bomber retaliated. Further outrage ensued when President Bush extended his condolences to the families of the victims of the suicide attack, and President Musharraf did the same, adding that terrorism will be eliminated “with an iron hand.” The point to be driven home is that the attack on the madrassah was kept as quiet as possible, while the suicide bombing was publicized as a tragedy, and one more reason to maintain the war on terror.
    Last year trouble escalated when the Pakistani government laid siege to the Red Mosque and more than 100 people were killed. “Even before his soldiers had overrun the Lal Masjid … the retaliations began.” Suicide attacks originating from both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani tribal militants targeted military convoys and a police recruiting center. Guerrilla attacks that demonstrated a shocking degree of organization and speed-not to mention strategic cunning revealed that they were orchestrated by none other than al-Qaeda’s number two man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri; a fact confirmed by Pakistani and Taliban officials. One such attack occurred on July 15, 2007, when a suicide bomber killed 24 Pakistani troops and injured some 30 others in the village of Daznaray (20 miles to the north of Miran Shah, in North Waziristan). Musharraf ordered thousands of troops into the region to attempt to restore order. But radical groups swore to retaliate against the government for its siege of the mosque and its cooperation with the United States.
    A July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concludes that “al Qaeda is resurgent in Pakistan- and more centrally organized than it has been at any time since 9/11.” The NIE reports that al-Qaeda now enjoys sanctuary in Bajaur and North Waziristan, from which they operate “a complex command, control, training and recruitment base” with an “intact hierarchy of top leadership and operational lieutenants.”
    In September 2006 Musharraf signed a peace deal with Pashtun tribal elders in North Waziristan. The deal gave pro-Taliban militants full control of security in the area. Al Qaeda provides funding, training and ideological inspiration, while Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Tribal leaders supply the manpower. These forces are so strong that last year Musharraf sent well over 100,000 trained Pakistani soldiers against them, but they were not able to prevail against them.
    The question remains, what does America do when Pakistan no longer has a Musharraf to bridge the gap? While Musharraf claims that President Bush has assured him of Pakistan’s sovereignty, Senator Obama obviously has no intention of honoring such an assurance. As it is, the Pakistanis do just enough to avoid jeopardizing U.S. support. Musharraf, who is caught between Pakistan’s dependence on American aid and loyalty to the Pakistani people, denies being George Bush’s hand-puppet. Musharraf insists that he is “200 percent certain” that the United States will not unilaterally decide to attack terrorists on Pakistani soil. What happens when we begin to do just that?

    In 2002 Musharraf was reported to have told a British official that his “great concern is that one day the United States is going to desert me. They always desert their friends.” Musharraf has more reason now to skeptical of his American allies than ever.

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